As Nations Gather in Bali, Indonesia Puts Its Lack of Imagination on Display

The problem here, I think, is the lack of a coherent grand strategy of Indonesian foreign policy. SBY wants it to be "grand," but without direction?

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As Nations Gather in Bali, Indonesia Puts Its Lack of Imagination on Display
Yohanes Sulaiman | July 19, 2011

With little fanfare, the 18th Asean Regional Forum got under way in Bali this past weekend. Sadly, local coverage of the meeting is next to nonexistent.

Such a lack of attention and promotion from both the Indonesian government and the media can be attributed to the fact that neither find it to be as important as local political scandals threatening President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s popularity.

It is a shame, because the forum will be attended by key players in global security, such as the US secretary of state and the foreign affairs ministers from North Korea, South Korea, Japan and China.

In the news at least, the Japanese are taking the forum seriously. The Japan Times, The Mainichi Daily News, NHK World, Nikkei and Kyodo News have launched an English language Web site solely to provide news of this meeting. Seoul is also looking at this forum intently, as its national news outlet Yonhap reported that the South Korean foreign minister was willing to meet his North Korean counterpart during the forum.

The attendance of global luminaries and the massive attention from the international news outlets show how vital the diplomatic community finds the Southeast Asia region. Were Indonesia prepared, it could take advantage of the global spotlight to showcase its international ambition and leadership in the Asean region.

The lack of promotion from the government may simply be because it does not know what to expect from this forum, considering the intractable problems on the table — from the Cambodia-Thailand border spats that threaten Asean’s raison d’être to China’s growing influence in the region, including in the South China Sea. Not to mention the speculation that the forum may be used to jump-start the stalled negotiations on the Korean Peninsula.

The Cambodia-Thailand border spats seem not to be ending anytime soon, in spite of Yingluck Shinawatra’s victory in recent Thai elections. Even though Yingluck decisively won Thailand’s recent election and her elder brother, the fugitive former Prime Minster Thaksin Shinawatra, has a good relationship with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, she had to tread the waters carefully, lest her opponents accuse her of selling out to Cambodia.

At the same time, the South China Sea will be on everyone’s mind. The growing might of China, its swelling blue-water ambition — evidenced by the recent unveiling of its new aircraft carrier— and its perceived provocations toward Asean countries that have made claims to the Spratly and Paracel island chains will put the relevancy of Asean to the test. At this point, Asean has no common policy or structure set in place to respond to the rise of China and India. Nor does it have a plan to deal with the waning of the US’s international commitments.

While the former US defense secretary Robert Gates announced in Singapore during his visit last June that “the US defense engagement and investment in Asia was slated to grow further,” he warned NATO just a week later that “there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress — and in the American body politic writ large — to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”

Even though such warnings were reserved for NATO, it also gave signals to other states that rely on US assistance that they have to keep “playing ball” lest the United States no longer provide military assistance due to the public resistance to continued spending of blood and money to be global policeman.
As the largest and the most populous state in Asean, Indonesia has the opportunity to rise to the occasion. Unfortunately, with the defense budget even lower than “the little red dot” city of Singapore and the likelihood that the budget will be slashed again in the near future, Indonesia’s commitment and ability to take the reins and lead regional security efforts are questionable.

Such diplomatic paralysis is deplorable and unfavorably compared to Indonesian diplomacy during Suharto’s New Order. Back in the 1980s, Indonesian foreign ministers Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas directed foreign policy toward the dual objectives of ending of the Vietnamese intervention and also the civil war in Cambodia. These foreign policy objectives were pursued in spite of objections from some Asean members who were hoping that the Cambodian conflict would, in Dewi Fortuna Anwar’s words, “bleed Vietnam white.”

For Indonesia back then, what really mattered was preventing China from increasing its regional influence and, secondly, the spread of communism after the Vietnam War. While many Asean countries were not pleased with Indonesia’s initiatives, in the end its foreign policy was vindicated with the ending of the Cambodian civil war, the withdrawal of Vietnam and the expansion of Asean through the inclusion of Vietnam. At the same time, both Indonesia and China were aware of their growing importance in global affairs, which led to the rapprochements of both countries and, subsequently, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990.

Such imagination and audacity is unfortunately lacking in Indonesia’s foreign policy objective today. Instead of trying to lead Asean, to find a breakthrough to end the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict and to create a common regional response toward the rise of the influence of China and India and the withdrawal of the United States from global affairs, Indonesia seems more interested in just holding the forum. In fact, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa was quoted as saying that he did not expect any resolution to many of these issues at the talks. To put it simply, there is no goal, no international objective to pursue.

In the end, Indonesia needs to get its groove back. It has to start acting again as the regional leader. We can start by taking a careful look at our foreign policy objectives.

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SBY’s Party Is Burning Down the House

This article was written while doing the research on public policy of Singapore. Talk about killing two birds with one stone.

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SBY’s Party Is Burning Down the House
Yohanes Sulaiman | July 13, 2011

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Center) with Democrat Chairman Anas Urbaningrum (Left) and Mohammad Jafar Hafsah. (Antara Photo/Widodo S. Jusuf)

While discussing the Democratic Party’s proverbial slow-moving train wreck, a colleague of mine remarked that the Nazaruddin case was akin to someone trying to get rid of a rat by burning down the house. The rat escapes, while the house is burned to the ground.

It is an apt description of the upheavals in the party, with frequent new revelations about how entrenched corruption is in its ranks. The brands of both the Democratic Party and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s have been forever tarnished.

Regardless of whether accusations involving Muhammad Nazaruddin — both those leveled against him and by him — are correct, the fiasco seems to prove the public’s worst fears, that corruption is entrenched in the political elite. Even in a government led by a party that campaigned under the slogan “Say No to Corruption,” a business-as-usual approach continues.

Still, the question remains, why is the house on fire at all? Corruption happens all over the world, even in Singapore, a country so regulated that there is a rule on the mandatory flushing of public toilets.

In 1966, Tan Kia Gan, then Singapore’s minister for national development, was investigated for accepting bribes worth 70,000 Singapore dollars ($57,000 in today’s terms). In 1976, the minister for the environment, Wee Toon Boon, was accused of accepting bribes worth more than 800,000 Singapore dollars from an Indonesian businessman. And in 1986, another minister for national development, Teh Cheang Wan, was investigated for accepting two bribes totaling a million Singapore dollars.

Yet such corruption scandals did not tarnish Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, nor Singapore’s stellar reputation as one of the cleanest nations on earth.

In Indonesia, on the other hand, the latest survey by the Indonesian Survey Circle found that only 47 percent of respondents approved of the government’s enforcement of the law, even though in October 2009, the Indonesian Survey Institute found that 84 percent of people approved of the government’s attempts to eradicate corruption.

The differences between Yudhoyono and Lee lie in the degree of decisiveness shown by the duo and their management of public perceptions.

In Singapore’s case, all three high-profile corruption cases were solved decisively and to popular satisfaction. Lee himself was instrumental in removing all of the ministers, regardless of their high positions in the government. Tan was stripped of his public appointments even though a witness refused to implicate him. Wee was convicted and imprisoned. Teh committed suicide before he was formally charged.

It is notable that the prime minister was instrumental in ensuring that these suspects were brought to justice. Instead of sitting idly by or intervening in favor of the defendants, Lee fostered an image of a stern leader unhappy with graft and working against the defendants by first stripping them of their immunity from prosecution and then by letting the wheel of justice move uninterrupted. When the defendants were judged guilty, he promptly stripped them of their positions. Not surprisingly, the image of Singapore as a serious, squeaky-clean place remains untarnished.

In Indonesia, Yudhoyono’s authority is steadily undermined by his own passivity in dealing with corruption scandals. In the Bank Century case, many people are convinced that former Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati was a scapegoat to save the Democratic Party. The presidential pardon of Aulia Pohan — a senior Bank Indonesia official and the father-in-law of one of Yudhoyono’s sons — smacked of nepotism and cronyism.

In the case of Nazaruddin, the party’s former treasurer, there have been official missteps and governmental agencies seem to be trying to outdo each other in destroying any remaining public trust in them. Nazaruddin’s ability to leave for Singapore raised eyebrows. This was followed by the revelation that Singapore had actually signed an extradition treaty and was waiting for Indonesia to follow suit.

When Yudhoyono last week berated his ministers, claiming they did only 50 percent of what he asked of them, the dressing down elicited collective yawns of “been there, done that.”

This was not the first time Yudhoyono had berated his ministers in public and yet all of them remained in place. Thus, instead of scoring political points, people saw it as a political gimmick to threaten other parties not to take advantage of the turmoil within the Democratic Party.

With official missteps occurring on a regular basis and the Nazaruddin case exposing corruption within the Democratic Party, it is no wonder that so many people are seriously questioning Yudhoyono’s true commitment to eradicating graft.

In contrast, Lee was known as a trigger-happy leader, willing to fire anyone who performed below his expectations. Not surprisingly, even today Lee remains influential in Singapore’s politics.

What really matters is whether people believe that the government will follow through on its promises. Many people believe that Nazaruddin’s accusations are truthful, as it vindicates their perception of the political elite.

In essence, the house is not burning due to a single rat. Rather, the house is burning because of a series of missteps by Yudhoyono and his party and a public weariness over corruption among the nation’s leaders.

SBY’s Challenge: Forget Popularity Polls And Focus on How to Leave a Legacy

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SBY’s Challenge: Forget Popularity Polls And Focus on How to Leave a Legacy
Yohanes Sulaiman | July 04, 2011

Why should anyone care about public opinion? That should be the question after the Indonesian Survey Circle announced that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s approval rating had dropped to 47.2 percent in its latest survey from 56.7 percent in January.

In the resulting brouhaha, it is interesting to observe that the pundits seem to be arguing that the president has lost his legitimacy to govern, even while knowing that public opinion is famously volatile in response to changing events. Any decision made by a leader is bound to upset a significant chunk of the population. Even though a policy may be beneficial in the long run, in the short term those who benefit from the status quo will be upset. Others will take issue with a policy that, in their eyes, does not go far enough to solve what they perceive as a national problem.

Leaders shouldn’t expect their approval ratings always to remain high. And fluctuations in public opinion should be seen as a normal after-effect of the decision-making process. Pundits are missing this important point in their haste to pounce on the survey results. Instead of asking why President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s approval rating has dropped below 50 percent, they should be asking why the president didn’t do more to pursue radical but important policies the nation desperately needed while his approval rating was high.

Dick Cheney, the former vice president of the United States, once said that he did not care about the “fluctuations in the public opinion polls,” and that what was important was for a leader to have a clear goal and stay the course, even if pursuing an unpopular policy — which in his case took the form of committing the United States to the very unpopular war in Iraq.

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq, it is clear that it understood the purpose of public opinion. Public opinion in essence is political capital, showing how much confidence a population has in a government to pursue any kind of policy. It must not be seen as something to be lauded, but as public goodwill that must be utilized effectively.

A high approval rating is basically a mandate to pursue long-term policies that may not be popular in the short term. Popularity provides political capital to buy time in pursuing controversial and oftentimes damaging short-term policies for the long-term benefit.

At the same time, any administration should make sure to use the presidential office as a bully pulpit, providing information and justification for decisions that the president makes, in order to slow down and arrest the inevitable decline of popularity due to the short-term impacts of long-term policies, and due to the constant political sniping from the opposition.

This kind of understanding is lacking in Yudhoyono’s administration. Ever since he was re-elected in 2009 with 64.7 percent of the vote, Yudhoyono has surprisingly been pursuing a very subdued domestic political program. In short, the president has been unwilling to commit himself to either breakthrough decisions or controversial issues. He regularly distances himself from headline-grabbing scandals, ranging from the witch-hunt against former Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati in the Bank Century case to growing religious disputes like the persecution of Ahmadiyah followers or the Bogor mayor’s blatant disregard for the rule of law in the Taman Yasmin church case.

Instead, the president seems to get involved only in trivial matters, on issues that are beneath the dignity of his office, like the mysterious SMS that alleged corruption in his Democratic Party or demands for his resignation from the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).

While Yudhoyono has managed to avoid the roller-coaster approval ratings typical of most presidents of democratic countries, he cannot avoid the gradual but persistent decline in his popularity, especially among people who are becoming more and more disillusioned with the lethargy, disorganization and confusion of this administration.

So what can the president do to turn around this situation?

First, he needs to strengthen his authority and utilize his spokesmen more effectively. Yudhoyono could save himself some grief by having better communication with the media, showing that he is always up to date with recent developments and ready to tackle any news, good or bad. The president, through his official mouthpieces, has the ability to influence the narrative of the news and provide damage control as needed.

Second, the president should be more willing to take political risks. And he should start by streamlining the bloated bureaucracy that does nothing but weigh down economic growth.

One of the main reasons economic growth has been so lethargic in comparison with neighboring states is the inefficient bureaucrats who keep adding layers of red tape, making it difficult for companies to invest and to expand, not to mention eating up the national budget through salaries, making less money available to develop much needed infrastructure.

He should also be willing to break some eggs by getting rid of his many ineffective and controversial ministers who damage the reputation of his administration, notably through their public relations blunders and ineffective efforts in combating corruption inside and outside the administration.

Yudhoyono should realize that his popularity will keep declining as long as those convicted of graft receive mere slaps on the wrist, and as long as graft scandals keep swirling around the Democratic Party itself.

Third, Yudhoyono should articulate a clear and coherent long-term policy to the public. Instead of just reacting to unfolding events, he should initiate a debate on what the government is going to do in the short and long term. What people want is a sense of direction and purpose that the administration up to now has failed to provide.

Finally, Yudhoyono should not worry about his declining popularity. Rather, he should use his still relatively high rating to pursue much-needed policies, to build the foundations of strong economic growth for his successors. That will be the best legacy he can leave for Indonesia.

Bashir’s Downfall Reflects Waning Influence of Radicals

Article written in collaboration with my colleague Brad Nelson, Ph.D.

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Bashir’s Downfall Reflects Waning Influence of Radicals
Brad Nelson & Yohanes Sulaiman | June 30, 2011

The recent arrest and sentencing of Abu Bakar Bashir, co-founder and spiritual leader of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, to 15 years in prison is unprecedented in Indonesia. While the government has arrested, imprisoned and sentenced many terrorists to death, it usually treads very carefully around religious figures such as Bashir. Bashir had been arrested and tried twice before, receiving light sentences in both cases.

The reason is easy to discern when one observes that during his previous stints in prison, Bashir was visited by various dignitaries, including then-Vice President Hamzah Haz. Put simply, the judiciary was bullied and under heavy pressure from a host of groups and individuals — who believed that Bashir and his radical movement were popular and able to bring them the bulk of the “Muslim-majority” votes — to give Bashir as light a sentence as possible.

Therefore it is surprising that this time no one of prominence has run to his defense. And we have not seen anyone showing their shock and indignation on national television. In fact, most news channels only briefly talked about the sentencing, then returned to their regular discussion of the corruption scandal that has enveloped the Democratic Party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

We can draw four conclusions from the fall of Bashir. First, Indonesians are simply tired of radical Islamists. In particular, they are sickened and disgusted by the violence and bloodshed committed against their fellow citizens. And this fact is reflected in the 2009 elections, where the share of votes for various Islamist parties declined significantly. Thus, politicians are now simply adapting to this new domestic political environment, and nobody is protecting Bashir from his comeuppance.

Second, Bashir’s group is no longer that useful politically. In Indonesia, there is a tradition of patrons protecting violent organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which is supposedly protected by several retired Army generals. Not surprisingly, these organizations and their members have frequently acted brutally with impunity. The fact that Bashir was sentenced to 15 years likely means that his organization is no longer as important as it once was.

And third, considering JI’s connection to Al Qaeda, Bashir’s case may also reflect on Al Qaeda’s lack of influence in the region. After all, the death of Osama bin Laden and the emergence of the Arab Spring have degraded Al Qaeda’s legitimacy and its operational capabilities, and proved its irrelevance in a world increasingly dominated by people-power movements.

Finally, it can be argued that in the long run, Indonesia’s democracy can reduce and limit the importance of radical groups in society. While in the beginning of the reform era it was believed the wave of Islamism was unstoppable, in the end, popular opinion, reflected in public polls and ballots, showed that radicalism remained a fringe movement. Even though some surveys showed a growing radicalism among teenagers and religious teachers, what is encouraging is the popular reaction being a feeling of outrage and disgust toward the results.

The impact of the media cannot be underestimated. With people seeing the impact of violence against their fellow citizens on television and the Internet, they were able to discern that terrorism was no longer something that was abstract and far from home. Indeed, it could no longer be denied that the radicals were capable of committing violence, nor could it be argued that terrorism was simply another Western plot against Indonesian interests.

Still, what is most important is whether this popular outrage can have a long-lasting effect on a court system that is notoriously corrupt and prone to political interference. After all, this will decide whether Indonesia finally extinguishes extremism and terrorism. Intelligence gathering, police work and the courts — these are the tools that should be primarily used in this international struggle. Sure, at times, military action might be required to take out terrorists and halt terror plots. But as the United States is finding out, it is much more cost-efficient and effective to prioritize legal and judicial means over military force.

The way Indonesia uses legal and judicial mechanisms against terrorism has long triggered questions about its backbone and will to fight violence and radicalism. Do the courts have the temerity to stand up to political pressure advocating softness and ineffectual punishments for terrorist crimes? The arrest and sentencing of Bashir, we hope, is one step toward putting these concerns to rest once and for all.

A Helping Hand for Workers Overseas

Here I am arguing that Indonesia should cooperate with Philippines to improve the training on its migrant workers and more importantly, to create a common front to improve their bargaining positions on migrant rights.

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A Helping Hand for Workers Overseas
Yohanes Sulaiman | June 23, 2011

The execution of Indonesian maid Royati binti Sapubi in Saudi Arabia was a deplorable affair. But while there are many people demanding the Indonesian government impose a moratorium on sending workers to the kingdom, such a measure would be of little help in addressing the root causes of the mistreatment of our workers abroad.

Domestically, there are several factors that enable Indonesian workers abroad to be treated badly. Lack of education and training is the most important. The majority of Indonesian workers abroad have only an elementary school education. This lack of knowledge is evident in Singapore’s Foreign Domestic Worker Entry Test, which measures basic aptitude in both English and housework. Reportedly, only 60 percent of Indonesian maids pass, compared with 90 percent of Filipinos.

The problems of poor language and work skills are not limited to Singapore. The Saudi Gazette has reported that many Indonesian maids falsify their age and health certificates, struggle with basic housework and speak no Arabic. In short, there is a serious problem with the quality of Indonesian domestic workers.

Lacking even rudimentary knowledge of language, it is difficult for the maid, a complete stranger in a foreign land, to communicate with others, let alone to navigate a complex legal system. As a result, once a maid is in Saudi Arabia, she is at mercy of her employer and the agency that sent her abroad.

Unscrupulous employers and employment agencies sometimes then exploit the uneducated worker. They may refrain from telling the maid about the labor laws that regulate her rights, such as her working hours and salary, or worse, deny her information about assistance available in times of trouble.

Combined with the Saudi legal system, which provides very little protection to foreign workers, the deck is stacked against an Indonesian maid should she face trouble.

There are also cases of employment agencies manipulating the identity of workers and the corresponding health certificates. While this ensures a profit and quick employment for the worker, it causes a major headache for the Indonesian government, as it becomes very difficult to keep track of citizens abroad. This may prevent a worker getting the timely legal help they may desperately need.

Indonesia still has difficulty persuading Saudi Arabia to improve the treatment of foreign workers. While the country has laws protecting workers in Saudi Arabia, laws protecting domestic workers have not yet been ratified.

The main obstacle in ratification is the fact that labor inspectors do not have the right to enter homes due privacy concerns. Saudis are very zealous in maintaining the privacy of their homes.

While in May Saudi Arabia and Indonesia flagged a memorandum of understanding, it was unclear how binding it would be, how much protection would be guaranteed and even whether it would be finalized within the proposed six-month time frame.

Maj. Gen. Abdullah Al-Sadoun, a member of the Shura Council, the formal advisory body to Saudi rulers, even argued that the proposal was tantamount to “delving into matters of security for the country and its citizens.” He speculated that it was Indonesia’s way to gather “sensitive national information on citizens’ personal lives.”

With the MoU uncertain, Indonesia should take action in securing the protection of its workers. One of the best ways to do so is by working together with the Philippines.

It is estimated that there are 4.3 million Filipinos working abroad (4.5 percent of the total population), in jobs ranging from domestic workers to professions such as doctors and engineers. Last year, remittances from Filipinos working abroad amounted to $21.3 billion, around 11.3 percent of GDP. In comparison, there are about 2.5 million Indonesians working abroad (1 percent of the total population) sending home at least $7.1 billion, or around 1 percent of GDP.

As both countries have significant numbers of their citizens working abroad, it would be in the best interest of both to create a common viewpoint on migrant worker protection.

Like Indonesian workers, Filipino workers overseas also experience abuse and its government has complained about the lack of legal protections for its workers in Saudi Arabia.

This year the Philippines played hardball in refusing to back down from its demand of monthly wage of $400, double the Saudi offer of $200. As a result, Saudis are now experiencing difficulties finding enough skilled replacements for Filipino maids.

Indonesia should take this opportunity to work together with the Philippines to ensure the protection of their workers abroad. As both countries are members of Asean and share a long and friendly history, such action could be used to deepen their relationship.

Indonesia should learn how the Philippines treats and trains its workers. At the same time, the Philippines can use Indonesia to help improve its bargaining position in regards to labor protection. This is a win-win proposition for both countries.

Indonesia must also improve its domestic safeguards to prevent abuses by employment agencies. One possibility is to have every prospective worker undertake mandatory training — to learn the language, basic household skills, and laws of the destination country — with a certificate awarded upon completion.

The training can be provided either by a state agency or state-approved private institutions. Of course, there should be constant monitoring. While this may be a hassle, it is a small price to pay to prevent another tragedy like the one involving Royati.

Good Old Suharto?

This article is published a few days after Suharto's birthday, simply arguing that it is not a good idea to see the past through rose-tinted glasses. Facing economic and political difficulties, it is easy to idealize the past, but the past itself may not be as beautiful as we thought.


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The Thinker: Good Old Suharto?
Yohanes Sulaiman | June 15, 2011

The debate on the legacy of Suharto and the New Order began immediately after his fall in May 1998.

Many people, notably those who felt the repressive hands of the regime, argued that the New Order was a failure, rife with nepotism and human rights violations. The loss of East Timor was the crown jewel on the top of the effigy of the failed idol of the New Order.

Reformasi and the new Indonesian democracy is supposed to derive its legitimacy from the idea that rule by the people will avoid the mistakes of the New Order and clean up all its messes. Having learned that Suharto’s strongman system didn’t work, democracy is supposed to be the power that saves the nation.

Therefore it was a terrible shock when Indobarometer dropped a bombshell last month in announcing that, based on a recent poll, Suharto beat other Indonesian presidents in terms of popularity by a large margin. The same survey also noted that 41 percent of the survey’s respondents believed that their lives were better under the New Order.

In short, 13 years after the fall of Suharto many people are longing for the good old days of the New Order. Not surprisingly, the findings caused a firestorm with experts, academics, politicians and talking heads questioning the methodology and political motivations behind the survey.

Regardless of the motivation, there is growing nostalgia for the New Order among Indonesians. This phenomenon of fondly recalling a fallen regime is not unique to Indonesia; the former states of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and East Germany, as well as Poland, have seen the same.

What’s important to note is that people are not nostalgic for the real past. Rather they are attracted to an idealized past — a constructed past that never existed in the first place, when the government was believed to be all-wise and all-benevolent, and everything was believed to be orderly.

Considering that today people are fed a steady diet of bad news, it is no wonder that people are longing for the days when everything seemed to be under control. But this is a mirage; the erstwhile government established order by sweeping everything under the rug and occasionally using extra-judicial measures.

The reason why today’s world is seemingly so chaotic is because there is so much openness, so much information swirling around, exposing all the misconduct. At the same time, the usually protected politicians today live under the glare of the spotlight, leading to many embarrassing exposes.

The government itself is not prepared to run a democracy. Instead of controlling and telling media what to write, it can only provide information. Yet the government doesn’t have well-developed media relations personnel. Not surprisingly, people are complaining about the lack of leadership.

It is important not to dismiss the Indobarometer survey as a walk down fantasy lane. The problem with such nostalgic feelings is that it creates unrealistic expectations of the current and future government — expectations that no government will ever be able to match.

Instead, both Suharto and the New Order must be humanized, to be seen and evaluated just as a normal human being with all their strength and weaknesses.

It is unfair to simply dismiss all these achievements of the New Order. Regardless of someone’s opinion on Suharto, it cannot be denied that he was rightfully a state hero, as he contributed much to national development. It is undeniable that the New Order regime managed to lift tens of millions of Indonesians from the jaws of poverty while achieving almost full literacy and various other social achievements in just a few decades.

On the other hand, the New Order’s many abuses cannot be denied. Corruption and nepotism were rife within the bureaucracy. Personal connections and corruptions made a mockery of the rule of law. The norms of professionalism were decimated in universities, judiciaries, the armed forces and other organizations that might potentially generate political problems, as Suharto personally vetted every single candidate for promotion. Political censorship and human rights abuses were commonplace. Those faults could not be simply swept away under the rug and ignored.

Such accomplishments and weaknesses of Suharto and the New Order regime must be treated fairly and mentioned in our attempts to understand the New Order. Therefore, in a belated celebration of Suharto’s birthday last week, let us hope that this and future generation of Indonesian leaders may learn the “human” Suharto and avoid his mistakes.

Economic Caveats

This article is posted not chronogically relative to the other articles in the list, because this article is behind TEMPO's paywall and I want to allow people to read my article in entirely. There are some editings that they made especially on the first two paragraph to introduce me as the author. Not sure why they cal me an economist, though from this article, I guess nobody can tell.

The Indonesian version of Tempo does not include neither my article nor the ASEAN report.

Off topic: dunno if I should trust this but apparently this version vanished from stands and at every hotel in Bali. It is said that foreign delegates took them all. Most likely to help them through the meeting, to whittle away those boring hours.

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November 16, 2011
Economic Caveats

Should everthing go as planned, by 2015 ASEAN will be launching its ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) set of principles, in which economies of ASEAN states will be more integrated. Are there lessons to be learned from the European Union case? Economist Yohanes Sulaiman, a lecturer at the Indonesian National Defense University sounds out some caveats.

The ASEAN Secretariat recently declared that  "the elimination of tariffs, free movement of professionals, freer movement of capital, and a streamlined customs clearance procedure" were elements of a regional economic community. In fact, the AEC aims to "transform ASEAN into a single market and production base that is highly competitive and fully integrated into the global economy." Eventually, it even wants to establish its own single currency.

If this scheme is successful, this might signal the coming of ASEAN as a new economic powerhouse. Similar to the European Economic Community that ended up becoming European Union, the ASEAN Economic Community would increase interdependence among member states and thus integration among member states into one cohesive bloc that could compete competitively in the global market thanks to its economic of scale. For instance, even in 2009, the combined ASEAN GDP was US$ 1.5 trillion, far ahead of India's US$ 1.2 trillion and Republic of Korea's US$ 833 million, though it was still below China's US 5 trillion.

Indeed, this will be a huge transformation from the current associative-like structure, where the main goal is to simply improve communication and to reduce tension among member states and to promote a mutually beneficial cooperation, without trying to interfere in domestic policy-making. By aiming to establish a single currency, ASEAN would have to interfere in its members' economic policies, in order to maintain the credibility of its currency.

So far, the economic indicators are encouraging. The average tariff on import from ASEAN nations is steadily declining from between 4-5% in 2000 to 1.05% in 2010. The reduction in tariff in turn helps fostering more intra-ASEAN trade, and in turn bolstering the region's economy.

The impact of the reduction in trade barrier is evident in the statistical data: the value of intra ASEAN trade has been steadily growing, except in the year 2009, when the global economic crisis started. By 2009, intra-ASEAN trade comprised 24.5% of total ASEAN's trade as noted in the following table:

Indicator	Unit/Scale	1998	2000	2003	2007	2008	2009
Intra-ASEAN Trade (export and import)	Value (US$ million)	120,918	166,846	206,732	401,920	470,112	376,207
	Growth (%)	-19.4	25.8	29.3	13.9	17	-20
	Share to total trade (%)	21	22	25.1	25	24.8	24.5

Source: ASEAN Trade Statistics Database (September 2010)

Yet the improvement in data could not paper over the underlying problem within the scheme, notably the significant differences in the GDP, population and the quality of population itself, poverty rate, bureaucratic hassles, and more importantly the creation institution that will manage the community.

Brunei and Singapore have the highest GDP per capita in the region at US$ 37,000, while in contrast, both Myanmar and Cambodia have the lowest GDP per capita at respectively US$ 446 and US$ 837. There is also difference in the number of population below the poverty line: Laos and Cambodia have a significant majority of their population living under poverty line.

Country	GDP (2008) In US $Billion	GDP per Capita (2008) in US$	Population (2008) in million	Human Development Index	Poverty head count ratio (%)	Regulatory Quality Rank	Ease of Doing Business Rank
Brunei	14.6	37,053	0.4	0.9	N/A	75.8	14
Cambodia	9.6	651	14.7	0.6	68	34.3	22
Indonesia	514.4	2.254	228.3	0.7	54	45.4	19
Laos	5.2	837	6.2	0.6	77	9.7	24
Malaysia	194.9	7,221	27	0.8	8	60.4	4
Myanmar	26.2	446	58.8	0.6	N/A	1	N/A
Philippines	166.9	1,847	90.3	0.8	45	51.7	21
Singapore	181.9	37,597	4.8	0.9	N/A	99.5	1
Thailand	260.7	3,869	67.4	0.8	12	59.9	3
Vietnam	90.7	1,052	86.2	0.7	48	32.4	13

Note:

• Regulatory Quality Rank reflects the ability of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private sector development.
• A high ranking on the "Ease of Doing Business" index indicates that the regulatory environment is conducive to the operation of business.

Source: Hall Hill and Jayant Menon, ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future (Asian Development Bank, December 2010)

Of course, for an associative organization such as ASEAN, such stark economic differences don't really matter. Yet, in a much stronger union with free flowing capital and trade and not to mention a common currency, such economic disparity will make it very difficult to create an agreed economic policy, due to the different economic needs of each member, even though a common economic policy is the foundation for a successful economic and currency union.

At the same time, there are problems with the bureaucracy and regulations. Singapore is the region's best place to do businesses with streamlined bureaucracy and business-friendly regulations, while in Indonesia, decentralization process that started after the fall of Suharto in 1998 made it very difficult to conduct business due to the patchwork of local regulations that sometimes contradicts the central government's directives, with little legal recourse available.

This in turn brings into question the implementation of the economic agreements that usually requires economic reforms and austerity programs especially in time of crisis. Will there be a political will from the governments of poor states that usually also have corrupt legal system to conduct much needed economic reform? More importantly, will there be an institution that will enforce the agreed agreements, not unlike the European Union bureaucracy in Brussels? All of these questions will matter when the good times are over and economic difficulties begin.

The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint unfortunately does not address those worst case scenarios. Rather, it punted by simply stating that "Ministers-in-Charge of Economic Integration in the Council of ASEAN Economic Community shall be accountable." Meaning, that the community will rely on self-policing and more consultations, which is the hallmark of the current ASEAN institution.

The problem is that as evident in the current turmoil in the European Union, the market simply won't wait during an economic crisis. It took a long time for consensus-driven European Union to get a rescue plan on the table and by then, the crisis had spread from Greece to Italy, creating a crisis of confidence, a much larger problem that even threatened the European Union itself.

Therefore, it might be wise to rethink the idea of 2015 ASEAN Economic integration. Rather than focusing on lofty goals, ASEAN should instead focuses on ironing the nitty-gritty, crafting a strong economic institution that can be used as a pillar of stability in times of trouble. While the current "consultative" style may be appealing to interference-averse nations, in times of troubles, when decisive actions are needed, it will be the straw that breaks the camelback.