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Bashir’s Downfall Reflects Waning Influence of Radicals
Brad Nelson & Yohanes Sulaiman | June 30, 2011
The recent arrest and sentencing of Abu Bakar Bashir, co-founder and spiritual leader of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, to 15 years in prison is unprecedented in Indonesia. While the government has arrested, imprisoned and sentenced many terrorists to death, it usually treads very carefully around religious figures such as Bashir. Bashir had been arrested and tried twice before, receiving light sentences in both cases.
The reason is easy to discern when one observes that during his previous stints in prison, Bashir was visited by various dignitaries, including then-Vice President Hamzah Haz. Put simply, the judiciary was bullied and under heavy pressure from a host of groups and individuals — who believed that Bashir and his radical movement were popular and able to bring them the bulk of the “Muslim-majority” votes — to give Bashir as light a sentence as possible.
Therefore it is surprising that this time no one of prominence has run to his defense. And we have not seen anyone showing their shock and indignation on national television. In fact, most news channels only briefly talked about the sentencing, then returned to their regular discussion of the corruption scandal that has enveloped the Democratic Party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
We can draw four conclusions from the fall of Bashir. First, Indonesians are simply tired of radical Islamists. In particular, they are sickened and disgusted by the violence and bloodshed committed against their fellow citizens. And this fact is reflected in the 2009 elections, where the share of votes for various Islamist parties declined significantly. Thus, politicians are now simply adapting to this new domestic political environment, and nobody is protecting Bashir from his comeuppance.
Second, Bashir’s group is no longer that useful politically. In Indonesia, there is a tradition of patrons protecting violent organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which is supposedly protected by several retired Army generals. Not surprisingly, these organizations and their members have frequently acted brutally with impunity. The fact that Bashir was sentenced to 15 years likely means that his organization is no longer as important as it once was.
And third, considering JI’s connection to Al Qaeda, Bashir’s case may also reflect on Al Qaeda’s lack of influence in the region. After all, the death of Osama bin Laden and the emergence of the Arab Spring have degraded Al Qaeda’s legitimacy and its operational capabilities, and proved its irrelevance in a world increasingly dominated by people-power movements.
Finally, it can be argued that in the long run, Indonesia’s democracy can reduce and limit the importance of radical groups in society. While in the beginning of the reform era it was believed the wave of Islamism was unstoppable, in the end, popular opinion, reflected in public polls and ballots, showed that radicalism remained a fringe movement. Even though some surveys showed a growing radicalism among teenagers and religious teachers, what is encouraging is the popular reaction being a feeling of outrage and disgust toward the results.
The impact of the media cannot be underestimated. With people seeing the impact of violence against their fellow citizens on television and the Internet, they were able to discern that terrorism was no longer something that was abstract and far from home. Indeed, it could no longer be denied that the radicals were capable of committing violence, nor could it be argued that terrorism was simply another Western plot against Indonesian interests.
Still, what is most important is whether this popular outrage can have a long-lasting effect on a court system that is notoriously corrupt and prone to political interference. After all, this will decide whether Indonesia finally extinguishes extremism and terrorism. Intelligence gathering, police work and the courts — these are the tools that should be primarily used in this international struggle. Sure, at times, military action might be required to take out terrorists and halt terror plots. But as the United States is finding out, it is much more cost-efficient and effective to prioritize legal and judicial means over military force.
The way Indonesia uses legal and judicial mechanisms against terrorism has long triggered questions about its backbone and will to fight violence and radicalism. Do the courts have the temerity to stand up to political pressure advocating softness and ineffectual punishments for terrorist crimes? The arrest and sentencing of Bashir, we hope, is one step toward putting these concerns to rest once and for all.
The reason is easy to discern when one observes that during his previous stints in prison, Bashir was visited by various dignitaries, including then-Vice President Hamzah Haz. Put simply, the judiciary was bullied and under heavy pressure from a host of groups and individuals — who believed that Bashir and his radical movement were popular and able to bring them the bulk of the “Muslim-majority” votes — to give Bashir as light a sentence as possible.
Therefore it is surprising that this time no one of prominence has run to his defense. And we have not seen anyone showing their shock and indignation on national television. In fact, most news channels only briefly talked about the sentencing, then returned to their regular discussion of the corruption scandal that has enveloped the Democratic Party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
We can draw four conclusions from the fall of Bashir. First, Indonesians are simply tired of radical Islamists. In particular, they are sickened and disgusted by the violence and bloodshed committed against their fellow citizens. And this fact is reflected in the 2009 elections, where the share of votes for various Islamist parties declined significantly. Thus, politicians are now simply adapting to this new domestic political environment, and nobody is protecting Bashir from his comeuppance.
Second, Bashir’s group is no longer that useful politically. In Indonesia, there is a tradition of patrons protecting violent organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which is supposedly protected by several retired Army generals. Not surprisingly, these organizations and their members have frequently acted brutally with impunity. The fact that Bashir was sentenced to 15 years likely means that his organization is no longer as important as it once was.
And third, considering JI’s connection to Al Qaeda, Bashir’s case may also reflect on Al Qaeda’s lack of influence in the region. After all, the death of Osama bin Laden and the emergence of the Arab Spring have degraded Al Qaeda’s legitimacy and its operational capabilities, and proved its irrelevance in a world increasingly dominated by people-power movements.
Finally, it can be argued that in the long run, Indonesia’s democracy can reduce and limit the importance of radical groups in society. While in the beginning of the reform era it was believed the wave of Islamism was unstoppable, in the end, popular opinion, reflected in public polls and ballots, showed that radicalism remained a fringe movement. Even though some surveys showed a growing radicalism among teenagers and religious teachers, what is encouraging is the popular reaction being a feeling of outrage and disgust toward the results.
The impact of the media cannot be underestimated. With people seeing the impact of violence against their fellow citizens on television and the Internet, they were able to discern that terrorism was no longer something that was abstract and far from home. Indeed, it could no longer be denied that the radicals were capable of committing violence, nor could it be argued that terrorism was simply another Western plot against Indonesian interests.
Still, what is most important is whether this popular outrage can have a long-lasting effect on a court system that is notoriously corrupt and prone to political interference. After all, this will decide whether Indonesia finally extinguishes extremism and terrorism. Intelligence gathering, police work and the courts — these are the tools that should be primarily used in this international struggle. Sure, at times, military action might be required to take out terrorists and halt terror plots. But as the United States is finding out, it is much more cost-efficient and effective to prioritize legal and judicial means over military force.
The way Indonesia uses legal and judicial mechanisms against terrorism has long triggered questions about its backbone and will to fight violence and radicalism. Do the courts have the temerity to stand up to political pressure advocating softness and ineffectual punishments for terrorist crimes? The arrest and sentencing of Bashir, we hope, is one step toward putting these concerns to rest once and for all.
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