An accompanying article to this can be found here in my other site at the Center for World Conflict and Peace.
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Bin Laden and Our Homegrown Radicals
Yohanes Sulaiman | May 09, 2011
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| Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, courtesy of Googlemap. |
Last week, the administration of Barack Obama celebrated its biggest achievement yet in the fight against terrorism: killing Osama bin Laden — something that eluded George W. Bush. The death of Bin Laden and the decline of Al Qaeda, however, may not entirely end the threat from radicals and terrorists.
Bin Laden’s death can easily be overestimated, as even before he was killed both his and Al Qaeda’s importance in the Muslim world and the global network of radicals had been in decline. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt show that Arabs can overthrow their government without the help of Al Qaeda.
Libyan rebels’ strong rejection of Muammar el-Qaddafi’s accusation that their struggle is being inspired and supported by Bin Laden shows that Al Qaeda is no longer seen as a defender of oppressed Muslims. Rather it is seen as irrelevant, and worse, a liability.
At the same time, many terrorist networks have gone native.
While there are still connections between local players and international networks — evident from Umar Patek’s arrest so near Bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan — the link has been fraying for a while now. Many Indonesian terrorists with links to Al Qaeda have been arrested, killed in firefights with police or executed, the rest are closely monitored while some of them have renounced terrorism.
Moreover, the terrorist attacks here were committed by people with no link at all to the global network of Al Qaeda, and caught authorities off guard.
Muhammad Syarif, the suicide bomber who hit a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java, was a lone wolf. And Pepi Fernando, who was behind the string of book bombs and a failed attempt to blow up a Catholic church in Serpong, Tangerang, was a former member of the KW9 branch of the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) movement. That branch has never had any strong connection to global terrorist movements. The group prefers to work peacefully, by cooperating and influencing Indonesia’s security apparatus and political class, while at the same time raising funds by fleecing gullible youths.
Indonesia’s radical movement is a network-based movement. Due to decades of repression under former President Suharto’s New Order regime, the radicals have become very careful. They only trust people they have known for a while or are introduced to by a close acquaintance. There is always the fear a person might be an intelligence agent.
Not surprisingly, when an NII member has been incarcerated, his credibility will suffer, due to the possibility he has been turned by authorities while in prison. As a result of this paranoia, Indonesia’s radical network is highly fragmented.
Due to the nature of the Indonesian network, Bin Laden’s role was very minimal and he could only trust and control those who used to work with him in Afghanistan. But for many radical youths with no direct link to his network, Bin Laden was still an inspiring leader they would obey.
Bin Laden was popular mainly because he stood up against the United States, and everyone loves a David versus Goliath tale.
Through the will of Allah, his intellect and guile, he had been able to outwit the strongest nation on earth, his supporters said. He thus inspired many restless youths and offered them hope — hope that his type of struggle would also work to overthrow the secular, corrupt and infidel Indonesian government backed by the United States that they hated so much.
Now that “David” is dead, however, his appeal will disappear. Even though many hard-line groups in Indonesia — such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) — lamented Bin Laden’s death, nothing will happen in the short term. “Goliath” has won and most organized radicals are smart enough not to risk their operations simply to avenge Bin Laden’s death.
This, of course, does not mean we can be sure there will be no attacks by people claiming they want to take revenge. Such attacks, however, would be conducted by isolated groups, driven by domestic considerations.
Something close to home, such as a lack of employment, disgust of a corrupt government or their desire to impose their interpretation of Islam as a way to save the nation would be their motive — not just their devotion to Bin Laden.
In other words, the “Bin Laden” label will only be used as a marker to link the local radicals to the global terrorist movement — possibly in the hope of gaining financial support from rich fanatics in the Middle East.
Still, in the worst-case scenario, further fragmentation of Indonesian radical networks may increase their impact because they become more unpredictable. These localized movements will be able to adapt and blend into society, making them difficult to detect. There is even a possibility that these new networks may succeed in linking up with the remnants of the Afghanistan network.
This is where the government must step in with an effective deradicalization program. Inside prisons, this program should focus on breaking up networks and turning former terrorists into useful members of society.
At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the reason why so many people are interested in radical ideology is because the government itself is not seen as a credible or responsible institution worth obeying.
Looking at the high levels of corruption, official misconduct, mismanagement of taxpayers’ money, overall injustice and abuse of power by politicians and law enforcers, some radical youths see terrorism merely as a way to save the nation from its rapacious elites.
People become radicals not just because of the US misadventure in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, they are sick of their own incompetent and corrupt government.
Believing that the Indonesian government only stays in power thanks to US backing, radicals still see their endeavor as a part of a cosmic struggle between good and evil.
It is this exemplary role that Bin Laden played for those within Indonesia’s fragmented radical movements — as the leader of the global jihad against corrupt governments.
Yohanes Sulaiman is a lecturer at the Indonesian National Defense University and a researcher at the Global Nexus Institute.
Bin Laden’s death can easily be overestimated, as even before he was killed both his and Al Qaeda’s importance in the Muslim world and the global network of radicals had been in decline. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt show that Arabs can overthrow their government without the help of Al Qaeda.
Libyan rebels’ strong rejection of Muammar el-Qaddafi’s accusation that their struggle is being inspired and supported by Bin Laden shows that Al Qaeda is no longer seen as a defender of oppressed Muslims. Rather it is seen as irrelevant, and worse, a liability.
At the same time, many terrorist networks have gone native.
While there are still connections between local players and international networks — evident from Umar Patek’s arrest so near Bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan — the link has been fraying for a while now. Many Indonesian terrorists with links to Al Qaeda have been arrested, killed in firefights with police or executed, the rest are closely monitored while some of them have renounced terrorism.
Moreover, the terrorist attacks here were committed by people with no link at all to the global network of Al Qaeda, and caught authorities off guard.
Muhammad Syarif, the suicide bomber who hit a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java, was a lone wolf. And Pepi Fernando, who was behind the string of book bombs and a failed attempt to blow up a Catholic church in Serpong, Tangerang, was a former member of the KW9 branch of the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) movement. That branch has never had any strong connection to global terrorist movements. The group prefers to work peacefully, by cooperating and influencing Indonesia’s security apparatus and political class, while at the same time raising funds by fleecing gullible youths.
Indonesia’s radical movement is a network-based movement. Due to decades of repression under former President Suharto’s New Order regime, the radicals have become very careful. They only trust people they have known for a while or are introduced to by a close acquaintance. There is always the fear a person might be an intelligence agent.
Not surprisingly, when an NII member has been incarcerated, his credibility will suffer, due to the possibility he has been turned by authorities while in prison. As a result of this paranoia, Indonesia’s radical network is highly fragmented.
Due to the nature of the Indonesian network, Bin Laden’s role was very minimal and he could only trust and control those who used to work with him in Afghanistan. But for many radical youths with no direct link to his network, Bin Laden was still an inspiring leader they would obey.
Bin Laden was popular mainly because he stood up against the United States, and everyone loves a David versus Goliath tale.
Through the will of Allah, his intellect and guile, he had been able to outwit the strongest nation on earth, his supporters said. He thus inspired many restless youths and offered them hope — hope that his type of struggle would also work to overthrow the secular, corrupt and infidel Indonesian government backed by the United States that they hated so much.
Now that “David” is dead, however, his appeal will disappear. Even though many hard-line groups in Indonesia — such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) — lamented Bin Laden’s death, nothing will happen in the short term. “Goliath” has won and most organized radicals are smart enough not to risk their operations simply to avenge Bin Laden’s death.
This, of course, does not mean we can be sure there will be no attacks by people claiming they want to take revenge. Such attacks, however, would be conducted by isolated groups, driven by domestic considerations.
Something close to home, such as a lack of employment, disgust of a corrupt government or their desire to impose their interpretation of Islam as a way to save the nation would be their motive — not just their devotion to Bin Laden.
In other words, the “Bin Laden” label will only be used as a marker to link the local radicals to the global terrorist movement — possibly in the hope of gaining financial support from rich fanatics in the Middle East.
Still, in the worst-case scenario, further fragmentation of Indonesian radical networks may increase their impact because they become more unpredictable. These localized movements will be able to adapt and blend into society, making them difficult to detect. There is even a possibility that these new networks may succeed in linking up with the remnants of the Afghanistan network.
This is where the government must step in with an effective deradicalization program. Inside prisons, this program should focus on breaking up networks and turning former terrorists into useful members of society.
At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the reason why so many people are interested in radical ideology is because the government itself is not seen as a credible or responsible institution worth obeying.
Looking at the high levels of corruption, official misconduct, mismanagement of taxpayers’ money, overall injustice and abuse of power by politicians and law enforcers, some radical youths see terrorism merely as a way to save the nation from its rapacious elites.
People become radicals not just because of the US misadventure in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, they are sick of their own incompetent and corrupt government.
Believing that the Indonesian government only stays in power thanks to US backing, radicals still see their endeavor as a part of a cosmic struggle between good and evil.
It is this exemplary role that Bin Laden played for those within Indonesia’s fragmented radical movements — as the leader of the global jihad against corrupt governments.
Yohanes Sulaiman is a lecturer at the Indonesian National Defense University and a researcher at the Global Nexus Institute.
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