Asean’s Border Crisis

This is another unpopular article - only diplomats were mentioning this and nobody else. Thus, I am convinced that topics on ASEAN and foreign policy are simply unpopular among Indonesians. Nobody gives a damn about Preah Vihear temple complex dispute since it is seen as so far away, and has limited impact on Indonesians' daily lives.

Asean’s Border Crisis
Yohanes Sulaiman | April 27, 2011

When it rains, it pours. Such is the case for Indonesia, still preoccupied with the Somali pirate hostage crisis even as the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple complex has yet again come to the fore. As this year’s chair of Asean, Indonesia bears the responsibility of trying to find a solution to the conflict.

Should the dispute escalate into war, as it currently threatens to, the entire raison d’etre of Asean could be called into question. If other regional powers, such as China, were to interfere, the bloc’s existence bloc could be in peril.

The rejection of Indonesia’s offer to send observers and mediators reflects badly on the country as a regional power and a key member of Asean. Likewise, the country’s own border problems with its neighbors, notably Malaysia and East Timor, fail to provide reassurance of its ability to diplomatically handle territorial disputes.

Indonesia’s position in the current dispute is not enviable. Even with its leadership role in Asean, it does not hold the power to force a settlement, due to the grouping’s principle of noninterference. There are no mechanisms in place for the regional body to settle disputes among its member nations. Asean’s only possible role in defusing the conflict is to act as an arbitration chamber, trying to help both parties reach an agreement.

The problem is that mediation is only possible when both parties are willing to work together to find a solution. At this point, such a scenario seems highly unlikely, as any evidence of concession from either Cambodia or Thailand could be seen as a sign of weakness, both domestically and internationally.

With nationalistic fervor at its peak in both countries, the governments of both nations are now in a difficult situation. On the one hand, neither can back down from the confrontation without losing face, which would expose the compromised government to domestic criticism. On the other hand, both also realize that going to war is not an option, especially as neither has the resources for an all-out war.

Cambodia maintains that it has a much stronger claim than Thailand to the temple complex. Backed by a 1962 decision by the International Court of Justice, Cambodia has continued to push for international intervention or mediation over the disputed area, believing that, in the end, international pressure will force Thailand to back down.

In the best-case scenario for Cambodia, the international settlement of the disputed area may even grant the country more territory; it might be able to claim more territory based on its “need” to protect and to preserve the temple area. In the worst-case scenario, it would still be left with its recognized claim over the temple complex.

Thailand is aware of these scenarios, and as a result it tries to make the issue a bilateral affair and thus hesitates to accept Indonesia’s offers to send unarmed military observers to the disputed region.

In Thailand, the escalation of the dispute is a consequence of the pressures of domestic politics and the polarized political climate that originated during former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s tenure.

In 2008, Thailand’s then-prime minister, Samak Sundaravej, seen as a supporter of Thaksin, agreed not to oppose Cambodia’s World Heritage bid for the site, and the foreign ministers of both countries signed a joint communique over the temple’s registration. The Thai government seemed to decide that cooperation was the most important thing, and besides, Unesco recognition would generate more tourism and provide assistance to preserve the already precarious condition of the temple complex.

Thailand’s Constitutional Court, however, ruled that the government had to submit the joint communique for parliamentary approval. With the opposition declaring that the government was surrendering Thailand’s sovereignty over the area for a business concession — sacrificing national interests for Thaksin’s commercial interests in Cambodia — the government had no desire to subject the matter to debate and so withdrew its support for the registration.

The stakes are high. Indonesia’s failure to settle this problem may further undermine both Asean and Indonesia’s international reputation. Should Indonesia fail to learn from the origins and the intricacy of the issue, it may find itself at the receiving end of future territorial disputes.