First, this article is popular among diplomats that I met in Jakarta. I met many who told me that they had read and loved this article. Seemed that I was one of the few people out there who was willing to call a spade a spade.
Second, this is technically my "first article" for the Jakarta Globe. Actually, I did send them one article on February 12 on Egypt with the title "What Next for Egypt." That article is enclosed at the end of this article. Not sure what happened, but I somehow sent the Egypt article to letters@thejakartaglobe.com and never heard anything from them until February 28, when someone named Mr. Ben Otto wrote:
Many thanks for your submission. We're a bit too late in responding to run this, I'm afraid, but would you have any interest in writing an analysis or update based on current events? Of especial interest would be any Indonesian angle you could bring to the text.
After some back-and-forths, he told me to just cc everything I sent to the Jakarta Globe to his email for immediate attention. After I sent this piece, however, he read that Dipo Alam article and queried further:
Thanks for this. Is it exclusive to the Globe? I noticed you had a piece in the Post today, and I wouldn't want to conflict with them if this were a multiple submission. If it is indeed exclusive, I'd be happy to run it, perhaps as early as Friday.I told him my policy of trashing everything that was rejected and never submitting anything to multiple newspapers at once and he trusted me.
For me, it was the beginning of a beautiful working friendship. Hopefully Mr. Otto and the rest of the Jakarta Globe's editorial staffs think the same.
----------------
Yohanes Sulaiman | March 05, 2011
Right from the beginning of its Asean chairmanship this year, Indonesia seemed to try to use its position effectively, notably by sending observers to the disputed area of the Preah Vihear temple on the Thai-Cambodian border. While the action was admirable and some proof that Asean is able to address issues of regional security, the bigger question remains: Is it possible to strengthen the role of the association considering its many structural weaknesses?
Established in 1967 in order to promote peace and stability in the region by fostering regional integration, cooperation and development, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has a fairly successful record in increasing economic cooperation and trade among its member states. Between 1993 and 2009, shares of intra-Asean trade increased from 19.2 percent of total trade to 24.5 percent due to the reduction of tariffs and intra-Asean investment.
As a political entity, however, the 10-member grouping has a mixed record.
On one hand, it appears to be able to promote peace and stability in the region, reducing friction among member states through its ability to gather leaders to discuss policies and reach agreements on various economic, social and cultural matters. On the other hand, it failed to create a common Asean foreign policy, uniting all 10 states in their response to international developments.
Unlike the European Union, Asean is lacking a strong formal institutional mechanism to force compliance from its member states. There is no integrative mechanism, a binding agreement that will require each member to follow a policy set by Asean. In the end, Asean is simply a place to associate, to draft politically non-controversial agreements that will not directly threaten states’ sovereignty, such as in matters of trade and social and cultural exchanges.
The lack of a common foreign policy is due to the fact that the only common denominator among all member states is their location in Southeast Asia.
Each member state is generally ready to give lip service to the necessity and the importance of Asean. But at the same time, each state also tries to make sure that Asean will not have the ability to impose its will upon individual states, especially in matters considered to be of national interest.
In other words, national interests still trump regional interests. Add the principle of non-interference among member states to the mix, and you have the perfect ingredients for a very weak common foreign policy. In the end, Asean members only agree on statements of concern, which actually borders on inaction.
This system works fine during times when there is a clear, easily identifiable and constant enemy (e.g. Communism during the Cold War). But it struggles in tackling issues that require a quick and coordinated response, like terrorism, the current upheaval in the Middle East and security problems in Asean’s own backyard, such as the Thailand-Cambodia border disputes and the Indonesia-Malaysian disputes over the Ambalat sea block.
Witness the impotence of Asean in addressing human rights abuses and electoral manipulation in Burma. While it is true that dialogue can solve problems, the problem is that, without the threat of punishment, there is simply no incentive for the Burmese government to stop the abuses. What would Asean do should if the junta refused to honor an agreement?
There are fears that this policy of relative inaction will backfire, since the record of Asean states on human rights issues is less than stellar. Look at Malaysia’s horrid treatment of Indonesian migrant workers and the persecution of followers of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.
But the problem is, there is simply insufficient political will among member states to strengthen Asean to the degree of the European Union, lest it threaten the states’ sovereignty and cause embarrassment for their respective governments.
Consequently, Asean is virtually ineffective in settling bilateral disputes among its member states, let alone trying to tackle important global issues that require commitment from its members.
This is a pity, considering the fact that Asean is perfectly situated to help tackle international problems. As a region bordering the rising powers of China and India, Asean actually could play a major role in defusing potential conflicts between them.
Being located in a multi-ethnic region, Asean can also play a role in mediating disputes between Western powers and China.
Having a huge Muslim population can also help bridging the chasm between the strategically important Middle East and Western states concerned about the rise of radical Islam.
Basically, Asean has a critical role to play in managing international conflict. The problem is that the lack of a formal structure to force compliance and commitment from its member states creates a huge credibility problem.
Of course, the biggest question that each member state of Asean should ask is whether it wants Asean to be strong enough to withstand the challenges of an uncertain world — or whether it is content with the current loose-knit association. As the Asean chair in 2011, Indonesia should try to answer this question, lest Asean continue to fade into increasing irrelevance.
---------
What Next for Egypt
While people are celebrating the end of Mubarak presidency, what really striking is the fact that Mubarak gave up his authority to the "military council," suggesting that a palace coup was going on behind the scene.
Having been overwhelmed by days of demonstration and popular outrage, the Egyptian military most likely considered that the only thing united the protesters at Tahrir Square was their intense dislike toward Mubarak and his regime. Thus they decided to nudge Mubarak out in order to maintain their influence in Egyptan politics and their perks (the Egyptian military is believed to control approximately 10% of total Egyptian economy).
Whether this action will lead to true democracy is remain to be seen as the opposition will most likely split after losing their common enemy and no longer be as intense in their pressure as when Mubarak was in power. This in turn will give the army a breathing space to consider their next steps.
For the time being, we will see is a massive populist acts in order to bolster the military regime's popularity among people, from declaring emergency law is canceled to arresting many deadweights, such as Mubarak's unpopular cronies.
It will be interesting to observe in the next several weeks what the military will do and this will heavily be influenced by the factions within the military itself, the other powers in the regions (notably the Saudis), and the United States (regardless of its lack of focus in the past few weeks).
Once the protesters split, between those who advocate for slow and ordered transition to democracy and those who want a quick leap across the chasm, the military will find itself at another crossroad and here the split between the hardliners and the pragmatists within the military will be important.
Note that I use these two terms in a very loose way, just to indicate how much their commitment to democracy. Basically as an institution, the Egyptian military, and in fact every military institution in the Middle East, have intense dislike toward political Islam which probably dated from the modernization of the military during the Ottoman Empire where the idea of professional army was spread from Europe.
What important is whether their dislike toward Ikhwanul Muslimin interferes with their commitment to democratization.
Should the hard liners, those who see the prospect of Ikhwanul Muslimin's rise of power is a huge threat to the state, manage to prevail, they may decide to impose crack down, especially if the Saudis manage to influence the decision-making within the military.
The unfolding events from the past few days made it clear that the Saudi's pressure to both the White House and Cairo was important to help maintaining Mubarak's tenuous grip to power. The Saudis might, in essence, minimize any risks of financial boycotts from both the United States and the European Union should the military decide to crack down.
Besides, it is not in the Saudi's interests to find Ikhwanul Muslimin, an organization that it did not approve, ruling the strongest state in the region.
Still, should the European Union be able to grow some spines and the Obama Administration be able to find its missing backbone, the pressure may be so intense that the Egyptian army may choose to pursue the Turkish path, where the military will consider itself as the guardian of revolution while closely watching the popular mood and political climate, in which only after the new government overreach and the public opinion turn sour that they will intervene as the savior of revolution.
At this point, the Ikhwanul Muslimin, having learned from the very successful Turkish model, would surely pursue the Turkish path and avoid antagonizing the mostly moderate population and the prickly military. This self restraint behavior will be very important to create a truly vibrant democracy in the Middle East.
Established in 1967 in order to promote peace and stability in the region by fostering regional integration, cooperation and development, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has a fairly successful record in increasing economic cooperation and trade among its member states. Between 1993 and 2009, shares of intra-Asean trade increased from 19.2 percent of total trade to 24.5 percent due to the reduction of tariffs and intra-Asean investment.
As a political entity, however, the 10-member grouping has a mixed record.
On one hand, it appears to be able to promote peace and stability in the region, reducing friction among member states through its ability to gather leaders to discuss policies and reach agreements on various economic, social and cultural matters. On the other hand, it failed to create a common Asean foreign policy, uniting all 10 states in their response to international developments.
Unlike the European Union, Asean is lacking a strong formal institutional mechanism to force compliance from its member states. There is no integrative mechanism, a binding agreement that will require each member to follow a policy set by Asean. In the end, Asean is simply a place to associate, to draft politically non-controversial agreements that will not directly threaten states’ sovereignty, such as in matters of trade and social and cultural exchanges.
The lack of a common foreign policy is due to the fact that the only common denominator among all member states is their location in Southeast Asia.
Each member state is generally ready to give lip service to the necessity and the importance of Asean. But at the same time, each state also tries to make sure that Asean will not have the ability to impose its will upon individual states, especially in matters considered to be of national interest.
In other words, national interests still trump regional interests. Add the principle of non-interference among member states to the mix, and you have the perfect ingredients for a very weak common foreign policy. In the end, Asean members only agree on statements of concern, which actually borders on inaction.
This system works fine during times when there is a clear, easily identifiable and constant enemy (e.g. Communism during the Cold War). But it struggles in tackling issues that require a quick and coordinated response, like terrorism, the current upheaval in the Middle East and security problems in Asean’s own backyard, such as the Thailand-Cambodia border disputes and the Indonesia-Malaysian disputes over the Ambalat sea block.
Witness the impotence of Asean in addressing human rights abuses and electoral manipulation in Burma. While it is true that dialogue can solve problems, the problem is that, without the threat of punishment, there is simply no incentive for the Burmese government to stop the abuses. What would Asean do should if the junta refused to honor an agreement?
There are fears that this policy of relative inaction will backfire, since the record of Asean states on human rights issues is less than stellar. Look at Malaysia’s horrid treatment of Indonesian migrant workers and the persecution of followers of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.
But the problem is, there is simply insufficient political will among member states to strengthen Asean to the degree of the European Union, lest it threaten the states’ sovereignty and cause embarrassment for their respective governments.
Consequently, Asean is virtually ineffective in settling bilateral disputes among its member states, let alone trying to tackle important global issues that require commitment from its members.
This is a pity, considering the fact that Asean is perfectly situated to help tackle international problems. As a region bordering the rising powers of China and India, Asean actually could play a major role in defusing potential conflicts between them.
Being located in a multi-ethnic region, Asean can also play a role in mediating disputes between Western powers and China.
Having a huge Muslim population can also help bridging the chasm between the strategically important Middle East and Western states concerned about the rise of radical Islam.
Basically, Asean has a critical role to play in managing international conflict. The problem is that the lack of a formal structure to force compliance and commitment from its member states creates a huge credibility problem.
Of course, the biggest question that each member state of Asean should ask is whether it wants Asean to be strong enough to withstand the challenges of an uncertain world — or whether it is content with the current loose-knit association. As the Asean chair in 2011, Indonesia should try to answer this question, lest Asean continue to fade into increasing irrelevance.
---------
What Next for Egypt
While people are celebrating the end of Mubarak presidency, what really striking is the fact that Mubarak gave up his authority to the "military council," suggesting that a palace coup was going on behind the scene.
Having been overwhelmed by days of demonstration and popular outrage, the Egyptian military most likely considered that the only thing united the protesters at Tahrir Square was their intense dislike toward Mubarak and his regime. Thus they decided to nudge Mubarak out in order to maintain their influence in Egyptan politics and their perks (the Egyptian military is believed to control approximately 10% of total Egyptian economy).
Whether this action will lead to true democracy is remain to be seen as the opposition will most likely split after losing their common enemy and no longer be as intense in their pressure as when Mubarak was in power. This in turn will give the army a breathing space to consider their next steps.
For the time being, we will see is a massive populist acts in order to bolster the military regime's popularity among people, from declaring emergency law is canceled to arresting many deadweights, such as Mubarak's unpopular cronies.
It will be interesting to observe in the next several weeks what the military will do and this will heavily be influenced by the factions within the military itself, the other powers in the regions (notably the Saudis), and the United States (regardless of its lack of focus in the past few weeks).
Once the protesters split, between those who advocate for slow and ordered transition to democracy and those who want a quick leap across the chasm, the military will find itself at another crossroad and here the split between the hardliners and the pragmatists within the military will be important.
Note that I use these two terms in a very loose way, just to indicate how much their commitment to democracy. Basically as an institution, the Egyptian military, and in fact every military institution in the Middle East, have intense dislike toward political Islam which probably dated from the modernization of the military during the Ottoman Empire where the idea of professional army was spread from Europe.
What important is whether their dislike toward Ikhwanul Muslimin interferes with their commitment to democratization.
Should the hard liners, those who see the prospect of Ikhwanul Muslimin's rise of power is a huge threat to the state, manage to prevail, they may decide to impose crack down, especially if the Saudis manage to influence the decision-making within the military.
The unfolding events from the past few days made it clear that the Saudi's pressure to both the White House and Cairo was important to help maintaining Mubarak's tenuous grip to power. The Saudis might, in essence, minimize any risks of financial boycotts from both the United States and the European Union should the military decide to crack down.
Besides, it is not in the Saudi's interests to find Ikhwanul Muslimin, an organization that it did not approve, ruling the strongest state in the region.
Still, should the European Union be able to grow some spines and the Obama Administration be able to find its missing backbone, the pressure may be so intense that the Egyptian army may choose to pursue the Turkish path, where the military will consider itself as the guardian of revolution while closely watching the popular mood and political climate, in which only after the new government overreach and the public opinion turn sour that they will intervene as the savior of revolution.
At this point, the Ikhwanul Muslimin, having learned from the very successful Turkish model, would surely pursue the Turkish path and avoid antagonizing the mostly moderate population and the prickly military. This self restraint behavior will be very important to create a truly vibrant democracy in the Middle East.
No comments:
Post a Comment