I actually got the idea for this paper after I received a call from the Indonesian Navy Headquarters at Cilangkap, asking me some questions regarding the geopolitics and conditions of Somalia. This short article was derived (and a sanitized version) of a much longer policy paper that I submitted upon their requests. In the longer policy paper, the analysis was more scatching and could not be published here due to its contents.
The take home point, however, was that the Indonesian bureaucracy was simply unprepared for global problems. Don't know if it made any impact, well, that's living.
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| Family members with loved ones aboard the pirate-held Sinar Kudus demand the government do more to free the crew during a demonstration in Jakarta on Monday. (AFP Photo) |
Sinar Kudus Hostage Crisis Exposes A Nation Unprepared for Emergency
Yohanes Sulaiman | April 19, 2011
The hijacking of an Indonesian-flagged cargo ship last month — and the crisis that persists to this day — brings to light problems in Indonesia’s decision-making process and foreign policy. The nation’s response has been too slow, unable to adapt to the sudden nature of a hijacking crisis. The insistence on taking the high road of “nonalignment,” too, ensures that when push comes to shove, Indonesia will find itself alone.
The glaring weakness of Indonesian decision-making was evident within hours after the news came that the MV Sinar Kudus had been hijacked off the coast of East Africa on March 16. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had cabinet-level meetings on March 18, 20 and 22 that resulted in two options: support the ransom negotiations or send in the Special Forces to free the crew. Two rescue frigates finally left Indonesia on March 23, had a rendezvous with Special Forces operators in Colombo, and departed from Sri Lanka on the 30th.
During that week of discussion, the pirates did not remain idle. Instead, they used the Sinar Kudus to launch an attack on another vessel 700 kilometers to the northeast of its original position. The attacked ship, MV Emperor, escaped hijacking thanks to its armed guards.
On March 19, the pirate-held Sinar Kudus operated close to the Strait of Hormuz, threatening the shipping lanes there, before moving on and reaching Socotra Island on the 22nd. It later evaded an Australian warship near Oman and reached Hobyo in Somalia where more pirates were picked up.
In other words, instead of going straight to Somalia, the pirates actually moved the ship farther away from Somalia in search of more prey, closing the window of opportunity — had Indonesia had any ship there — to intercept and to launch a rescue mission. In the week that it took Indonesia to reach a decision, the pirates had complete freedom of action, allowing them to use the ship as a springboard for further attacks and to get reinforcements, all of which would make it more difficult to launch any operation to free the ship. By the time the Indonesian warships reached the area, the Sinar Kudus was back in Somalia.
In contrast, Russia, South Korea, the United States and Malaysia have launched successful rescue missions, thanks to their ability to respond rapidly. These nations took only a few hours to react and to shadow the hijacked vessels, preventing pirates from sending reinforcements. When rescue operations were launched, the pirates were exhausted and stressed out, thanks to constant harassment by the rescue warships.
So far, from the Sinar Kudus hijacking we can learn two things about Indonesian decision-making.
First, it is overly centralized. Orders come straight from the president. In contrast, in the United States, the US Navy has freedom of action as mandated by standard operating procedures. When they receive a distress call, any available warship in the area will pursue a pirate-seized vessel and wait for further orders. This kind of directive makes it easy should those higher up in the chain of command, including the president, authorize any action.
Second, Indonesia’s decision-making is agonizingly slow. It took three cabinet-level meetings before it was finally decided to pursue two courses of action. While this was the best way to keep everyone in the political coalition informed and in accord, precious time to launch a rescue mission was wasted. Worse, there was no Indonesian warship in the area. Not surprisingly, Indonesia is now facing equally unpalatable options: agree to the pirates’ ransom demands or launch a rescue mission under very difficult circumstances.
In the first weeks after the hijacking, the Indonesian media was preoccupied with the issue of a new luxury tower for the legislature and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) lawmaker Arifinto’s porn predicaments. The diversion of attention away from the hijacking gave the government some breathing room. After these issues died down, however, the hijacking came back to the fore with a vengeance and talking heads in the media had a field day in comparing the current situation with how former President Suharto’s government handled the hijacking of Garuda Flight 206 in 1981.
Constantly badgered by media demanding a rescue mission, the president is now in a difficult situation. By paying the ransom, he will be seen as a softie, a weak president who can be pushed around even by a bunch of pirates. Worse, the pirates themselves, seeing the Yudhoyono government is anxious to clean up this affair as soon as possible, will play for time, demanding more and more money, especially when they think it unlikely that Indonesia will find a way to retaliate. There’s a precedent for this: On Friday, pirates kept a number of hostages even after the Indian government had paid a ransom for the release of another seized vessel.
As for the other option, a rescue operation is very difficult to pull off. Unlike in 1981, the hostages are far away and in hostile territory, with no hope for collaboration from an ineffective Somalian government. While a successful operation will give a major boost to the president’s reputation, a failed mission will badly hurt his image and undermine his government further. Worse, people will start comparing his performance to Malaysia’s success in liberating a hijacked ship. Stuck between a rock and a hard place, not surprisingly the government has tried to play down news of the hijacking.
It can be argued that our Navy has only a small number of ships. Combined with the costs involved, any rescue mission outside the country must have approval from the president himself.
Other nations facing sea hijacking threats have found a solution in joining a military alliance, notably with the United States. Under the umbrella of the Combined Maritime Forces, the United States and its allies patrol the seas and provide support to the members of the alliance. While Indonesia has a cordial relationship with the United States, the fact that it is not a part of the US security alliance makes it difficult to gain access to intelligence, let alone military support or assistance in combating piracy. The alliance has no responsibility to provide support to Indonesia.
And even if it did, any association with this alliance, or asking for help from any other country, would be politically problematic back in Indonesia. It would be seen — unfairly — as proof of the incompetence of our Navy, and in turn, Yudhoyono’s government.
While it is impossible to turn back the clock, Indonesia must take heed of these lessons. Indonesia has to streamline its decision-making process, allowing for more freedom of action lower in the chain of command and, at the same time, improve the quality of its Navy.
Without any serious effort from the government to address these issues, Indonesia will find itself in the same predicament should this kind of emergency arise again. Or worse, in time of war, invaders may take advantage of Indonesia’s slow decision-making, with disastrous results.
zerodiversity
12:00pm Apr 19, 2011
I was optimistic when Pak SBY won his 2nd election. However, his term has been consistently marred by indecision and ambiguous positioning on critical issues. I am disappointed because I thought that Pak SBY would be the one to guide our country towards greater things. gregorfence
6:40am Apr 20, 2011
Have ready 20 condolence cards. Thats not a hard copy paste thing to decide.
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