Why ‘Tunisian revolution’ won’t reach Indonesia

This article was written in response to the comments of so many political elites in Indonesia, who easily throw around the idea of "Tunisian Revolution" in Indonesia.  Careful reader of this article will find the seeds of my arguments that I will elaborate in my later blog post, notably on the importance of fragmented political elites in order to push for a successful transfer of power. I am very careful here in not using the term "democratic transition," since we are not even sure whether the liberal democratic camp will end up winning in every single state that experienced upheaval.

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Why ‘Tunisian revolution’ won’t reach Indonesia

Yohanes Sulaiman, Jakarta | Thu, 02/17/2011 10:28 AM

The Tunisian revolution is an attractive phenomenon because it provides a great story about how the poor and the weak, under constant and heavy pressures from an authoritarian regime, finally snapped and managed to overthrow the dictatorship.

It is basically a template to the Internet-based social movement in the 21st century, replacing the old religious or labor-based mass movements that are either co-opted or crippled by the heavy hands of state.

“The Tunisian model” is also appealing because it transcends the usual social cleavages that prevent opposition from uniting under one banner. By using Facebook and Twitter, activists were able to summon people from diverse backgrounds, political views, etc., united only by their disgust with economic hardship and the excesses of the government.

Witness the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which did not do anything until the protest was at full steam when it agreed to join the movement. It stressed that the nature of the protest remained independent and secular and that the Muslim Brotherhood was just another participant, not the organizer of the protest.

The Tunisian model provides the impetus, the driving force, for the protest movement to emerge and to create groups to pressure the undemocratic regimes all over the Middle East. Basically, the poor had enough with the government’s wanton abuse of power and demanded justice. Not surprisingly, both Yogyakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwono X and former vice president Jusuf Kalla warned that Indonesia might experience a “Tunisian revolution”.

Such assertion, however, is incorrect due to several important factors. Most importantly, the problem with the Tunisian model is that it does not have the ability to create an institution that will be able to sustain the movement over the long run should the government decide to stall or to resist.

“Democracy provides an outlet so that popular outrage can be channeled through legitimate means.”

While it is true that through electoral manipulations, the police force and the state apparatus, Ben Ali was able to rule Tunisia for decades, but he did not have a strong organization that he could rely on when things turned violent. It is agreed that the Tunisian Army’s unwillingness to support the government was the final nail in Ben Ali’s coffin.

Egypt, however, is a different story. While there has been discontent within the Egyptian bureaucracy and elites regarding the longevity of Mubarak’s rule and his desire to install his son as his successor, the army had the interest to keep the Egyptian government from collapsing.

Unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian army founded the government. The army considers itself as a bulwark against what it senses as national threats, notably the Muslim Brotherhood. While the rank and file may agree with the protesters’ demands to overthrow Mubarak, the army and protesters parted ways as soon as Mubarak left office. The protesters wanted to completely overhaul the state. The army, on the other hand, was wary of anarchy and radical Islamism (regardless of whether it is real or imagined) and wanted to proceed slowly.

Conversely, protests fizzled in Yemen, Jordan and Syria. While it can be argued that government concessions may be a factor, or they are waiting for the events in Egypt to play out, it can’t be denied that the three government’s decisions not to violently repress the protests helped buy breathing space for these administrations.

The political elites were also mostly united, strengthening the hands of the governments. While there will be protests inspired by the Tunisian revolution, the euphoria will soon end and without the government adding fuel to the fire and it will not reach the intensity of either Egypt or Tunisia.

The protest movement, however, will not spread to Indonesia, regardless of the assertions of Kalla and Hamengkubuwono X. Even though people are fed up with corruption, government mishandling of the economy, religious violence and rising food prices, there is simply no sense of stagnation and helplessness that is evident in the protests in the Middle East.

In the Middle East, the continuing domination of the dictatorships of Ben Ali and Mubarak and the belief that both of them would remain on top, or in the Mubarak case, would be succeeded by his despised son, had fueled the demonstrations.

In Indonesia, however, it is agreed that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, regardless of his popularity, will step down and can no longer run in the 2014 election. There is no overt attempt to change the rule of law in favor of SBY or anyone in his family.

In other words, people actually have a chance to choose a leader that they want, regardless how talented or how useless the leader is. Furthermore, there is no law or regulation that prohibits or prevents any legitimate protest movement or political party to oppose any official policy.

Basically, there is simply no focus of ire and no ultimate target that can sustain the fury of the protesters in the long run.

Not surprisingly, protests in Indonesia after Reformasi were usually short and sporadic.

In a nutshell, democracy provides an outlet so that popular outrage can be channeled through legitimate means. Such an outlet was missing in both Tunisia and Egypt. As a result, when people decided that they had enough and organized to launch a massive protest movement, such movements could destabilize the regime, especially when the elite within the regime were not strongly united behind the leader. This same mechanism also brought down president Soeharto in 1998.

Today, however, such a movement will not materialize in Indonesia because of the safety valve called democracy.