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America and Asean: It’s Complicated
Brad Nelson & Yohanes Sulaiman | November 14, 2011
Barring any last-minute change, US President Barack Obama will attend the end of the Asean summit in Bali this week. His trip will come under the cloud of the ongoing economic crisis in Europe, where the fate of the euro and the unity of the European Union itself is in doubt as never before.
With America’s economy in disarray, Europe is now forced to ask China for economic assistance. Indeed, the prognosis for the US economy remains bad, with doubts growing globally that the United States can do anything to lead the world out of its economic doldrums.
Underlining the gravity of the situation, there will also be an Asean Plus Three (Japan, China and South Korea) meeting at the same time as the Asean-US gathering, meaning Obama is going to be put directly in the path of the Chinese economic steamroller.
There is some good news for the United States, such as the growing resentment of several Southeast Asian nations, including the rising giant India, toward the 800-ton Chinese panda. But the message implicit in the arrangement of the double summit is clear: Obama cannot take his eyes off the ball in Asia.
It is true that China itself is experiencing some economic problems of its own. While China’s economic growth still sets the bar worldwide, it’s predicted to decline by 0.5 percent this year and by the same margin again in 2012. Some economists fear a rapid economic slowdown as early as 2013.
China’s real estate market is on the downswing. Global demand for Chinese goods is slowing, and to make the situation worse, Chinese consumers are unable to replace declining exports.
Yet, what is important here is the perception among Asian countries that China, regardless of its economic troubles, is still on the rise while the United States is declining both in economic and military terms.
Regardless of Beijing’s insistence that its actions are benign and that it has no designs in the region, some Southeast Asian nations see the situation differently. To them, China’s growing influence will negatively impact the region, from its involvement — whether real or imagined — in the internal politics of countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma and Thailand to its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.
While Washington has stepped up its engagement with Asia over the last year, questions about American leadership exist. Facing a perceived existential threat from China, the region wants America’s undivided attention. The problem is that they perceive Obama as constantly distracted by other events, including his domestic battles with a hostile Congress. The health care debate, for instance, derailed his much-anticipated visit to Indonesia in March 2010 and drowned out much public discussion of other important issues for months.
Additionally, even though some pundits with inside knowledge of the White House, such as journalist Fareed Zakaria, have claimed that Obama wanted to focus on Asia right from the beginning of his term, it took more than two years for him to begin to shift his attention this way. Granted, he had to attend to two wars in the Middle East, but that’s not really an excuse. As time passed, and as the United States remained bogged down in the Middle East, events continued in Asia. And China continued its rise.
Arguably, it is this concern, as much as any deliberate intentions by Obama, that triggered the White House to shift its attention toward Asia. Obama has dispatched Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and, most recently, Gates’s successor, Leon Panetta, largely to reassure wary Asian countries of America’s commitment to the region.
Moreover, Obama’s doctrine of “leading from behind” in Libya creates further confusion about America’s commitment to Asia. Specifically, will the United States apply this foreign policy approach to Asia? Will it try to get other friendly countries to take up its current roles here? By delegating military and economic support to one or several surrogates, the United States could reduce its overseas burdens. For those who are tired of US imperialism, this might sound like a good thing.
But here lies a major problem. On the one hand, for many countries in Asia, the United States is seen as a fickle partner that displays knee-jerk reactions to any perceived human rights abuses.
Take the example of Indonesia, which was on the United States’ side during the cold war. It found itself in the figurative doghouse with an embargo imposed on its armed forces after the Dili Massacre in 1991. The embargo itself was lifted recently, but the lingering effect remains. With troubles currently brewing in West Papua, Indonesia is wary that any misstep will be perceived as systemic human rights abuses, triggering another embargo. Not surprisingly, the military and political elites in Indonesia are very distrustful of US intentions.
On the other hand, Indonesia, like other countries in the region, recognizes that it needs America’s political, economic and security presence to balance against China if necessary. Like it or not, the United States plays a crucial role in the stability of Asia. In the absence of a strong US presence, there’s no one country or group of countries to take its place, which will leave already nervous countries even more worried about their standing in the changing geopolitical order.
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