What Is the President Trying to Do? Maybe the History Books Can Help

Nothing new under the sun. Instead of streamlining the bureaucracy (thus making sure the buck stops on his desk), Indonesian rulers tend to blur the lines, creating infighting and thus making himself to be crucial to the workings of the bureaucracy.


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What Is the President Trying to Do? Maybe the History Books Can Help
Yohanes Sulaiman | October 19, 2011

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed Nasaruddin Umar as deputy religious affairs minister (center), Denny Indrayana as deputy justice minister (right) and Widjajono Partowidagdo as deputy minister for energy and mineral resources. (Antara Photo/Widodo S. Jusuf)

Anyone wondering why the president would add so many deputy ministers to his cabinet might look to Indonesia’s history, starting from the Dutch’s involvement in Java.

Theoretically the kings of Java were very powerful. In reality, however, their power was circumscribed by the difficult terrain of Java itself. Ruling a realm full of jungles and surrounded by sea, with roads barely passable during the rainy season, the Javanese kings were hard-pressed to impose control over a huge, unwieldy swath of territory. It was thus in their best interest to keep the nobles happy, which meant involving them in any decision-making processes. So if there was a rebellion, it would be met by a united front.

The arrival of the Dutch upended the existing order. The king was no longer the source of power, and the Dutch habitually influenced political outcomes by throwing their weight around in disputes among the Javanese. In one instance, they got involved when Sultan Amangkurat I, the successor of the mighty Sultan Agung, asked for assistance in putting down the Trunajaya rebellion. Following that, the Dutch intervened on the side of the king in a number of civil wars.

The Dutch, however, found this policy to be expensive and unprofitable. For the Dutch East India Company (VOC), the main goal was profit, not costly wars of attrition that would sap its energy and manpower. Thus, the Dutch hoped to set up some sort of balance of power among the Javanese, which would stabilize politics and make it easier for them to do business there. They went about this by playing royal claimants against one another.

The kingdoms of Surakarta and Yogyakarta were formed on this principle. The Dutch would act as arbiters of peace, promising to join with any kingdom to fight military aggression by another. Surakarta and Yogyakarta were roughly equal in power, so Dutch involvement on one side would have granted a decisive superiority. In turn, should both kingdoms be wiling to maintain peace, the Dutch would guarantee the successions of each of their kingships.

This systemized strategy of pitting more-or-less equally strong competitors against one another had a long life, as it is still being used in Indonesia today to ensure that no one has too much power.

During the Guided Democracy, President Sukarno established what late journalist Rosihan Anwar called a triangle of power between himself, the Army and the Communist Party. Back then, the Army had no legitimate grounds for political involvement, unless through the declaration of a state of emergency, which was eventually provided by President Sukarno. In the face of an Army crackdown, the Communist Party needed Sukarno’s protection to survive.

At the same time, Sukarno needed the mass organization that only the Communist Party could provide and the Army to keep the communists in check. For good measure, Sukarno tried to split the Army by attempting to balance the powerful Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution against the rising Gen. Achmad Yani.

The entire effigy, however, came crashing down after the infamous September 30 Movement, which triggered the murky, still-disputed chain of events that culminated in the downfall of Sukarno.

When Gen. Suharto rose to the presidency in 1967, he too played power games. In the 1970s, Suharto used the same system as Sukarno to ensure that nobody within the armed forces could gain enough power to rise up and threaten him.

First, he balanced Gen. Sumitro with Gen. Ali Murtopo. Then, after Murtopo became too strong, Suharto promoted Benny Murdani and purged the bureaucracy of pro-Ali elements. In the 1990s, the country was riveted by the rise of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) and the dynamics between the Green ABRI, a faction of the military, and the Red ABRI.

With Suharto’s fall in 1998, the Army left politics for good, and government once again became the domain of politicians and their parties. But with no presidential election ever providing any one of them a decisive, absolute victory, Indonesian presidents, in order to ensure they remain at the top of the food chain, have had incentive to act like the Javanese kings. For Yudhoyono in the recent reshuffle, that meant including at least one representative from every major political party in his cabinet.

On one hand, this guarantees the stability of the presidency. On the other, it comes at the expense of professionalism and efficiency and makes for a bloated cabinet. Moreover, it pushes ministries toward becoming treasure chests for political parties, with the president unable to interfere lest he incur the parties’ wrath. Their treasuries flush from their cabinet representatives’ ministry projects, political parties can live to fight another day.

Yudhoyono seems to be trying to recreate this historical dualism in his cabinet in order to attain the control that has so far eluded him. I once speculated that the president might have believed he could cement his rule through high popularity ratings; the recent steep drop in that popularity must have spooked him into looking for other ways to assert control. The president is surely looking to tighten his grip over the emboldened coalition parties, especially Golkar, which has outmaneuvered him through a number of scandals, including the recent Bank Century scandal.

While it seems certain that the next cabinet will include mostly politicians and not professionals, it looks like Yudhoyono is hoping that by adding deputy ministers he can heighten his own power by weakening ministers from other parties, especially those who have the potential to be his strongest rivals, such as Golkar. He could be calculating that by creating new deputy ministers, the bureaucrats will instinctively figure out who really wears the pants. At the very least he might be trying to cause confusion, damaging the political parties’ hold on their ministries.

Of course, the million dollar question is, where will Yudhoyono go from here? Will the president use this opportunity to truly purge the bureaucracy of corruption, nepotism and collusion, creating a much-needed legacy for Indonesia’s future? Or will this just be another flash in the frying pan, all ending up with nothing more than a lot of groaning from people who see opportunities being squandered?

For Indonesia’s sake, I hope Yudhoyono is making the right choice.
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devine

6:09pm Oct 19, 2011

"For Indonesia’s sake, I hope Yudhoyono is making the right choice"... yes that is what we were hoping over and over again... it just never happened and I strongly doubt why things should suddenly change for the better now... he is simply not living up to the expectiations of the people.

DrDez

8:13pm Oct 19, 2011

Yohanes - an instructive article.
As we have discussed previously SBY is failing the nations poorest and most vulnerable - This changes not one thing - if anything it makes it worse because of his pretence... We are bound to give him a chance.
The last thing - It totally pisses me off that in a democracy over 45% of the executive board have not been elected

BilboBaggins

9:13pm Oct 19, 2011

He's trying to cover something, can't think what that is though?

Yohanes-Sulaiman

11:19pm Oct 19, 2011

@devine: Agree, but it is an obligatory ending for this kind of op-ed. :D

@DrDez: The 45% number is not an accident. It is a way to create layers and layers of bureaucracy that will absorb many of the disgruntled people and at the same time, muddling things up. In such a confused bureaucracy, you have lots and lots of possibilities to do and approve things that may not possible in a democratic state with strong bureaucracy.

@BilboBaggins: I think Aunt Mavis got it right. There are some others, but thanks to Tommy's successful lawsuit on Tempo, nobody is going to try to spell it in this kind of newspaper.

justapasserby

3:03am Oct 20, 2011

this is a complete white wash of dutch colonialist history. does yohanes sulaiman imply that the kingdom of surakarta and jogjakarta was somehow independent of the dutch? that the dutch was only an ally of one side against the other? I think not. The dutch considers all those kingdoms a substate within their empire.. up to this time, actually, in holland they still think and teach that Indonesia was rightfully theirs, and that the war in 1945 was a rebellion against the rightful owner of the land. Italy paid 5 billion usd as a "we're sorry" for their few years in desert libya.. I wonder how much the dutch would have to pay for their 350 years plundering this land of milk and honey..

Valkyrie

4:14am Oct 20, 2011

Bilbo,

He's beginning to be conscious that many are aware he's the King with new clothes.

Yohanes-Sulaiman

8:48am Oct 20, 2011

@justapasserby: I advised you to read great books authored by M.C. Ricklefs to have a fuller picture on the dilemmas and problems that the Dutch and the Royal houses faced during this period. Try to make a distinction between the Dutch Colonial Empire that started approximately from 1799 after the collapse of the VOC and the Dutch VOC Empire. VOC was a great power, but not that great and powerful to be able to conquer and pacify an island as rugged as Java. Until the fall of the VOC, we could consider the kingdoms of Surakarta and Jogjakarta to be independent of the Dutch. Heck, the only reason why the Dutch loved the partition was because they could not beat Mangkubumi and Mas Said in the battlefield.

Plus there's something called malaria that killed many of the European officers that arrived in Indonesia.

@Valkyrie: I think he'd be content to be left in peace composing his new theme songs.

DrDez

9:29am Oct 20, 2011

Yohanes
Yes - that is a fact and many people realise it - but where is the outcry?? My analysis is that there will be not change save a few high profile cases that are a distraction from greed and selfishness
Re Justypasserby - he/she I am afraid wants to blame the West and the Dutch for everything, is never willing to see that Indonesia or Islam is at fault, has some weird opinions on divorce etc etc - I am wondering if he/she is purebred reincarnate..

Yohanes-Sulaiman

10:59am Oct 20, 2011

@DrDez: I think aside of a few academics and people who really pay attention to bureaucracies, the majority of Indonesians were simply unaware of how bloated and useless the bureaucracy is. Well, let me rephrase it. People know of how inefficient the bureaucracy is, based on their regular interactions with the usual state apparatchik on the bottom of the food chain, e.g. license procurements, but they were unaware of all these high-level structure, e.g. all these national committees, coordinating bodies, special teams, etc. Most of them fly under the radar thus people are simply unaware - or probably taking the usual approach of "see, hear, say no evil."

DrDez

2:08pm Oct 20, 2011

Yohanes
It saddens me to agree with you.